since 2000 (4, 5) , the chance for these types of incidents increases as railroads install additional 20 multiple track sections in order to increase capacity. These so called "Shared-Use Rail Corridors 21 (SRC)" are expanding as passenger rail operations have increased in the United States (6 -9) . 22 Consequently, ATAs have been identified as an increasingly important hazard on these SRCs (6) . 23 Derailments without an intrusion may cause equipment and infrastructure damage, passenger 24 casualties and disturb system operations, but ATAs can result in all of these and in addition may 25 lead to more severe consequences due to involvement of multiple trains. 26 27 Under normal conditions, the loading gauge (aka clearance plate) of rolling stock in a train stays 28 within the clearance envelope of the track it is on ( Figure 2a) . However, if a derailment occurs 29 the derailed equipment will generally exceed the clearance envelope of the track it is on ( Figure   30 2b), and possibly intrude on an adjacent track's clearance envelope. If the latter occurs, it is 31 referred to as an intrusion (Figure 2c ). When an intrusion occurs, there is a possibility that 32 another train operating on the adjacent track, either at or approaching the intrusion site, will 33 result in a collision with the derailed equipment ( Figure 2d ). An ATA consists of three sequential events: 1) an initial derailment in multiple track territory, 2) 6 intrusion of the derailed equipment onto an adjacent track, and 3) the presence of another train 7 on that track. Two variants of this type of ATA are the focus of the research presented in this 8
paper. In the first type an intrusion occurs and there is a train is on an adjacent track at the same 9 time and location resulting in an immediate collision as the derailing equipment impacts the 10 other train. In the second scenario, an intrusion occurs when a train on an adjacent track is 11 approaching the intrusion site leading to a potential collision with the debris from the first 12 derailment. 13 14 There are other ATA scenarios such as a direct collision between two trains on adjacent tracks. An example fault tree for train-to-train collisions developed by RSSB is shown in Figure 3 . It is 4 color-coded based on the relative ranking for each accident cause, which is supported by data 5 from RSSB's train accident database. Accident causes highlighted in red have the highest risk 6 ranking, meaning that these are causes most in need of attention. Accident causes highlighted in 7 yellow have medium risk and the ones in green have low risk. 8 9 10 FIGURE 3 RSSB fault tree for train-to-train collision (14) 11 12 There is some prior research addressing risk assessment of adjacent track accidents. Lin et al. 13 proposed a semi-quantitative method to evaluate general ATA risk (3 As discussed above an ATA is a sequential event ( A "success" in the event tree is defined as an event that does not occur, which is the safer 7 alternative. A "failure" means that the event does occur and represents the unsafe alternative.
8
For instance, the black node on the left in Figure 4 indicates whether an initial derailment occurs.
9
If it does, it is considered a "failure" because the occurrence leads to an intrusion, which is the 10 next stage of an ATA. Therefore, in Figure 4 , the path for the probability of the occurrence of the 11 initial derailment, D, goes downward (the direction of occurrence), while the path for its 12 complement probability, D ̅ , goes to the right (the direction of non-occurrence and results in a 13 success scenario (no accidents). This may be counter-intuitive because in reliability engineering, 14 a "success" usually means that a component or procedure functions or "occurs", but in ATA risk, 15 prevention of the event is the desired outcome. We therefore define the "success" of the system 16 as the non-occurrence of an ATA (scenarios S1, S2 and S3 in Figure 4 ), and system failure as the 17 occurrence of an ATA (scenario F1 in Figure 4 ).
19
The event tree is divided into four scenarios. When an initial derailment does not occur, the train 20 runs normally and the system is safe (success scenario S1). The probability of S1 is simply the 21 non-occurrence of the initial derailment (denoted as D ̅ ). The subsequent probability components 22 are not examined in this case because the first event does not occur. If the initial derailment 23 occurs but the intrusion does not, the derailed train will not collide with trains on adjacent tracks.
24
Although this scenario may still cause damage and system disturbance, it will not result in an 25 ATA and is labeled as success scenario S2. The probability is the occurrence of the initial Define the "success (S)" to be the non-occurrence of the accident (safe operation), and the "failure (F)" to be the occurrence of the accident (system failure). The descriptions for each scenario are as follows: S1: The train does not derail. The railroad system operates as normal S2: The train derails but does not intrude the adjacent track. Although the railroad system is interrupted, but this is not in the scope of "adjacent track accident". Thus, it is considered a "success" in this particular event tree.
S3:
The train derails and intrudes the adjacent track, but there is not other trains on adjacent track at the time of accident. Although the multiple tracks are affected, there is no collision between trains on adjacent tracks in the end, so it's considered a system success in terms of ATA. Figure 5 shows the fault tree for an ATA. Since the initial derailment, the intrusion, and the 3 adjacent train presence events need to occur in a specific order, they are connected by the any sub-accident cause group can be further deducted into more detailed failure modes based on 8 the resolution of analysis and data available. Transfer gates can also be used for each sub-9 accident cause to create more detailed fault trees, which are outside the scope of this paper.
11
Intrusion from derailed equipment (I)
12
The major impact of intrusion events is the excessive displacement of derailed equipment. Some or absence of the intrusion detection system increases the probability that a train will be unable 34 to stop short of the intrusion. Braking itself may also fail due to mechanical problems or human 35 factors.
37
Boolean Algebra Probability Calculation
38
After the fault tree is constructed, the probability of top event occurrence can be calculated using The probability of the initial derailment is the cumulative probability of infrastructure (DT), 
Finally, the probability of the adjacent train presence is the cumulative probability of the failure 20 to stop clear of the initial derailment (TF) and direct presence of a train on adjacent track (TT).
21
Each corresponds to the cumulative probability of lower level events shown in the fault tree The probability of an ATA can therefore be expressed in Boolean algebra as: The result can be used to identify the minimal set of basic events so that the occurrence of these 34 events guarantees the occurrence of the top event. The probability of the union of all minimal cut 35 sets is the probability of ATA. This is the foundation of the quantitative evaluation of the 36 probability of ATA. Once the data for each element of the fault-tree is acquired, the probability 37 of ATA can be calculated. 
